No-miracles argument

Definition

The no-miracles argument is a philosophical reasoning used to support scientific realism, asserting that the success of scientific theories would be a 'miracle' if those theories were not at least approximately true representations of the world. This argument highlights that the reliability and predictive power of science suggest that our best scientific theories are likely to be true or at least close to the truth about unobservable entities and processes.

5 Must Know Facts For Your Next Test

1. The no-miracles argument emphasizes that if scientific theories were not true, it would be inexplicable why they are so successful in making accurate predictions and explanations.
2. This argument is often contrasted with anti-realist positions, which claim that the success of science does not necessarily imply truth about unobservable aspects of the world.
3. The no-miracles argument serves as a significant defense for scientific realism against skepticism about the existence of unobservable entities postulated by science.
4. Critics of the no-miracles argument argue that there can be alternative explanations for the success of scientific theories, such as luck or pragmatic considerations.
5. Philosophers like Hilary Putnam and Richard Boyd have been influential in articulating and defending the no-miracles argument as a cornerstone of scientific realism.

Review Questions

• How does the no-miracles argument support scientific realism against anti-realist critiques?
  • The no-miracles argument supports scientific realism by asserting that the extraordinary success of scientific theories would be inexplicable if those theories were not approximately true. In contrast to anti-realist critiques, which suggest that the success of these theories could arise from alternative explanations, the no-miracles argument maintains that such success strongly implies a truthful representation of both observable and unobservable aspects of reality. Thus, it offers a robust rationale for accepting scientific realism as a credible viewpoint.
• Evaluate the implications of the no-miracles argument for our understanding of unobservable entities in science.
  • The implications of the no-miracles argument for understanding unobservable entities are profound. It posits that if our best scientific theories accurately predict phenomena involving unobservable entities—such as electrons or black holes—then we have good reason to believe these entities exist and are accurately described by these theories. This challenges anti-realist perspectives by arguing that dismissing these entities undermines the very basis upon which successful scientific practice rests, highlighting a deep connection between scientific success and ontological commitments.
• Critically analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the no-miracles argument in contemporary philosophy of science.
  • The strengths of the no-miracles argument lie in its compelling assertion that the remarkable predictive success of science points towards a realist interpretation of theory—suggesting that our best scientific frameworks are indeed capturing truths about reality. However, its weaknesses emerge from criticisms regarding alternative explanations for this success, such as instrumentalism or luck. Critics argue that even if a theory is successful, it doesn't necessarily reflect an accurate account of reality; it may just serve as a useful tool without corresponding truth. This ongoing debate illustrates the complexities involved in adopting a realist perspective and raises questions about how we define truth in science.

Related terms

Scientific Realism: The view that scientific theories provide a true or approximately true description of the world, including unobservable entities.

Instrumentalism: The belief that scientific theories are merely useful instruments for predicting observable phenomena, rather than true descriptions of the world.

Theory of Reference: A framework in philosophy of language that examines how terms in scientific theories relate to the objects they refer to, particularly in discussions about realism and anti-realism.