🔠Intro to Semantics and Pragmatics Unit 3 – Sense and Reference in Semantics

Key Concepts

• Sense refers to the cognitive or descriptive content associated with a linguistic expression, capturing its meaning or "mode of presentation"
• Reference denotes the actual object, individual, or truth value that a linguistic expression points to in the world
• Frege's distinction between sense and reference aims to explain how two expressions can refer to the same object while differing in cognitive significance
• Semantic puzzles, such as identity statements and substitution failures, motivated Frege's introduction of the sense-reference distinction
• The distinction helps account for the informativeness of identity statements and the apparent failure of substitution in opaque contexts
• Sense determines reference, meaning that the cognitive content associated with an expression guides us to the actual referent
• The sense-reference distinction has applications in various areas of language, including proper names, definite descriptions, and natural kind terms

Historical Background

• Gottlob Frege, a German philosopher and mathematician, introduced the sense-reference distinction in his 1892 paper "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" ("On Sense and Reference")
• Frege's work aimed to provide a systematic analysis of language and meaning, laying the foundations for modern philosophy of language and linguistic semantics
• The distinction emerged as a response to puzzles concerning identity statements and the substitution of co-referential terms in certain contexts
• Frege's ideas were influenced by his work in logic and his desire to create a logically perfect language for expressing mathematical truths
• The sense-reference distinction built upon earlier philosophical discussions of meaning, particularly those of John Stuart Mill and Bertrand Russell
• Frege's contributions marked a significant shift in the understanding of meaning, moving away from purely referential theories and recognizing the cognitive aspects of language

Frege's Distinction

• Frege proposed that linguistic expressions have two semantic components: sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung)
• Sense captures the cognitive or descriptive content associated with an expression, representing the "mode of presentation" or way in which the referent is given to us
• Reference is the actual object, individual, or truth value that the expression designates or points to in the world
• Two expressions can have different senses while sharing the same reference
  • Example: "The morning star" and "the evening star" both refer to the planet Venus but express different modes of presentation
• Sense is a public, objective entity that determines the reference of an expression and is grasped by competent language users
• The sense of a complex expression, such as a sentence, is composed of the senses of its constituent parts
• Frege argued that the sense-reference distinction is necessary to explain the cognitive significance of identity statements and the informativeness of certain sentences

Sense vs. Reference Examples

• Proper names:
  • "Mark Twain" and "Samuel Clemens" have different senses but refer to the same individual
  • The sense of "Mark Twain" might include descriptions like "the author of 'Huckleberry Finn'" or "the famous American humorist," while the sense of "Samuel Clemens" might include "the person born in Florida, Missouri, in 1835"
• Definite descriptions:
  • "The current President of the United States" and "the 46th President of the United States" have different senses but currently refer to the same individual (Joe Biden)
  • The sense of each description captures a different way of identifying or thinking about the referent
• Natural kind terms:
  • "Water" and "H2O" have different senses but refer to the same substance
  • The sense of "water" might include descriptions like "the clear, potable liquid that falls from the sky as rain," while the sense of "H2O" captures its chemical composition
• Sentences:
  • "The morning star is the evening star" and "The morning star is the morning star" have different cognitive values despite having the same referent (the planet Venus)
  • The first sentence expresses an informative identity, while the second is a trivial tautology

Semantic Puzzles

• Identity statements: Frege's distinction helps explain the informativeness of true identity statements like "Hesperus is Phosphorus" or "Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens"
  • Although both terms in each statement refer to the same object, they express different senses or modes of presentation
  • Discovering the truth of such statements can be cognitively significant and informative, as it connects two different ways of thinking about the same referent
• Substitution failures: The sense-reference distinction accounts for the apparent failure of substitution in opaque contexts, such as propositional attitude reports or modal statements
  • In the sentence "Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly," substituting "Clark Kent" for "Superman" may change the truth value of the statement, even though both names refer to the same individual
  • This is because the sense of the terms, not just their reference, is relevant in such contexts
• Negative existential statements: The distinction helps address the problem of empty names or non-referring terms in statements like "Vulcan does not exist"
  • Frege proposed that such statements express a thought or sense, even if the subject term lacks a reference
  • The sense of the statement can be understood and evaluated as true or false, regardless of the existence of the purported referent

Applications in Language

• Proper names: The sense-reference distinction has been applied to the analysis of proper names, with debates about whether they have a sense, a reference, or both
  • Some theories, like descriptivism, hold that proper names are associated with descriptive senses that determine their reference
  • Other theories, like direct reference theory, argue that proper names directly refer to their bearers without the mediation of a sense
• Definite descriptions: Frege's distinction has been used to analyze the meaning and referential properties of definite descriptions, such as "the tallest building in the world"
  • Russellian theories treat definite descriptions as quantificational expressions, while Fregean theories assign them a sense that determines their reference
• Natural kind terms: The distinction has been applied to the study of natural kind terms, like "gold" or "tiger," which refer to categories of objects sharing essential properties
  • Debates have arisen about whether the sense of natural kind terms includes scientific essences or is based on observable features and linguistic conventions
• Compositionality: Frege's idea that the sense of a complex expression is determined by the senses of its parts has influenced theories of compositional semantics
  • The principle of compositionality holds that the meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meanings of its constituent parts and their syntactic arrangement

Criticisms and Debates

• The ontological status of senses: There are debates about the nature and existence of Fregean senses, with some questioning whether they are abstract entities or mental representations
• The transparency of sense: Critics have argued that Frege's notion of sense is not always transparent or fully grasped by language users, challenging the idea that sense determines reference
• The necessity of sense: Some philosophers, like Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam, have argued that proper names and natural kind terms directly refer without the mediation of a Fregean sense
  • These theories emphasize the role of causal chains and external factors in determining reference
• The granularity of sense: There are questions about how finely-grained or individuated senses should be to account for differences in cognitive significance
• The sense of empty names: The treatment of non-referring terms and empty names remains a point of contention, with debates about whether they have a sense, a reference, or neither
• The application to attitude reports: The sense-reference distinction has been challenged in its ability to fully explain the behavior of terms in propositional attitude reports and other opaque contexts

Related Theories

• Descriptivism: The view that the meaning of a term, particularly a proper name, is equivalent to a definite description or set of descriptions that uniquely identify its referent
  • Descriptivists argue that the sense of a name is given by the associated descriptions
• Direct reference theory: The view that certain terms, like proper names and indexicals, directly refer to their objects without the mediation of a Fregean sense
  • This theory emphasizes the role of causal chains and external factors in determining reference
• Two-dimensionalism: An approach that distinguishes between two aspects of meaning: the primary intension (a function from possible worlds to extensions) and the secondary intension (a function from possible worlds to extensions, given a fixed actual world)
  • Two-dimensionalism aims to reconcile Fregean and Kripkean intuitions about meaning and reference
• Possible world semantics: A framework that analyzes the meaning of expressions in terms of their extensions across possible worlds
  • This approach has been used to model the intensions of expressions and to capture modal and counterfactual reasoning
• Situation semantics: A theory that takes situations, rather than possible worlds, as the basic units of semantic analysis
  • Situation semantics aims to provide a more fine-grained and context-sensitive account of meaning and information
• Relevance theory: A pragmatic approach that emphasizes the role of inferential processes and contextual factors in determining the meaning and relevance of utterances
  • Relevance theory builds upon Gricean principles of communication and has implications for the interpretation of referential expressions