🆚Game Theory and Economic Behavior Unit 12 – Market Competition & Oligopoly Models

Key Concepts

• Oligopoly market structure characterized by a small number of firms that dominate the industry and have significant market power
• Game theory framework used to analyze strategic interactions and decision-making between firms in an oligopoly
• Nash equilibrium concept describes a situation where each firm's strategy is the best response to the strategies of its competitors
• Collusion occurs when firms in an oligopoly cooperate to set prices, divide markets, or limit production to maximize joint profits
• Price leadership model involves a dominant firm setting prices while smaller firms act as price takers and follow the leader's pricing decisions
• Kinked demand curve model suggests that firms in an oligopoly face a kinked demand curve due to the anticipated reactions of competitors to price changes
  • Demand is relatively inelastic above the kink and relatively elastic below the kink
  • Firms have little incentive to change prices due to the potential for price wars or loss of market share
• Dominant firm model describes a market where one large firm has a significant cost advantage and sets prices while smaller firms act as a competitive fringe
• Stackelberg model involves a leader firm making decisions first, followed by follower firms reacting to the leader's choices

Market Structures Recap

• Perfect competition characterized by many small firms, homogeneous products, free entry and exit, and no market power
• Monopolistic competition features many firms producing differentiated products with some degree of market power but low barriers to entry
• Monopoly market structure has a single firm dominating the industry with significant market power and high barriers to entry
• Duopoly is a special case of oligopoly with only two firms in the market
• Oligopoly lies between the extremes of perfect competition and monopoly, with a small number of firms having considerable market power
  • Firms in an oligopoly are interdependent and must consider the reactions of competitors when making decisions
• Concentration ratios (CR) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) used to measure the degree of market concentration in an oligopoly
• Barriers to entry in an oligopoly can include economies of scale, network effects, legal barriers (patents), and high fixed costs

Oligopoly Basics

• Oligopolies prevalent in industries with high fixed costs, significant economies of scale, or network effects (automobiles, airlines, telecommunications)
• Firms in an oligopoly are interdependent, meaning that the actions of one firm affect the profits and strategies of its competitors
• Strategic interaction between firms is a key feature of oligopolies, as firms must anticipate and respond to the moves of their rivals
• Collusion can occur explicitly through formal agreements or implicitly through tacit understanding and parallel behavior
  • Collusion is illegal in many countries due to its potential to harm consumers and reduce market efficiency
• Non-price competition common in oligopolies, as firms compete on factors such as product quality, advertising, and innovation to differentiate their products
• Oligopolies can lead to inefficiencies, such as higher prices, reduced output, and slower innovation compared to more competitive market structures
• Game theory provides a framework for analyzing the strategic interactions and decision-making processes of firms in an oligopoly

Game Theory in Oligopolies

• Game theory is a mathematical approach to modeling strategic interactions between rational decision-makers, such as firms in an oligopoly
• Games in oligopolies involve firms (players) making decisions (strategies) that affect their own and their competitors' payoffs (profits)
• The prisoner's dilemma is a classic example of a game theory problem that illustrates the tension between individual and collective interests
  • In the context of oligopolies, firms may have an incentive to cheat on collusive agreements to maximize their own profits, even though cooperation would lead to higher joint profits
• Nash equilibrium is a key concept in game theory, describing a situation where each firm's strategy is the best response to the strategies of its competitors
  • In a Nash equilibrium, no firm has an incentive to unilaterally change its strategy given the strategies of the other firms
• Repeated games are common in oligopolies, as firms interact with each other over an extended period
  • Repeated interactions can facilitate collusion by allowing firms to establish trust, monitor behavior, and punish deviations from agreed-upon strategies
• Trigger strategies, such as tit-for-tat, can be used to enforce collusive agreements by threatening retaliation if a firm deviates from the agreed-upon strategy
• Game theory helps explain the stability of collusive agreements, the likelihood of price wars, and the incentives for firms to engage in non-price competition

Strategic Decision-Making

• Firms in an oligopoly must consider the potential reactions of their competitors when making strategic decisions
• Pricing decisions are a critical aspect of strategic decision-making in oligopolies
  • Firms must weigh the benefits of increasing prices (higher profit margins) against the risks of losing market share to competitors
  • Price wars can occur when firms repeatedly undercut each other's prices in an attempt to gain market share, leading to lower profits for all firms
• Quantity decisions involve firms choosing how much to produce, taking into account the production levels of their competitors
  • The Cournot model describes a situation where firms simultaneously choose their output levels, assuming that their competitors will maintain their current output
  • The Stackelberg model involves a leader firm choosing its output first, followed by follower firms reacting to the leader's decision
• Capacity investments, such as building new plants or expanding production lines, are long-term strategic decisions that can affect the competitive dynamics of an oligopoly
  • Excess capacity can be used as a deterrent to entry or a means of punishing competitors who deviate from collusive agreements
• Advertising and product differentiation strategies are important for firms in an oligopoly to distinguish their products from those of their competitors and maintain market power
• Research and development (R&D) investments are crucial for firms in oligopolies to innovate and stay competitive, particularly in industries with rapid technological change

Oligopoly Models

• Cournot model describes a situation where firms simultaneously choose their output levels, assuming that their competitors will maintain their current output
  • The Cournot equilibrium occurs when each firm's output level is the best response to the output levels of its competitors
  • In the Cournot model, firms have an incentive to produce more than the collusive output level, leading to lower prices and profits compared to collusion
• Bertrand model assumes that firms compete on price rather than quantity, with each firm setting its price simultaneously and independently
  • In the Bertrand model, firms have an incentive to undercut each other's prices, leading to fierce price competition and prices equal to marginal cost (the competitive outcome)
  • The Bertrand paradox suggests that even a duopoly can result in perfect competition if firms compete on price and have identical costs
• Stackelberg model involves a leader firm choosing its output level first, followed by follower firms reacting to the leader's decision
  • The Stackelberg equilibrium occurs when the leader firm maximizes its profits, anticipating the reactions of the follower firms
  • In the Stackelberg model, the leader firm has a first-mover advantage and can achieve higher profits than in the Cournot model
• Kinked demand curve model suggests that firms in an oligopoly face a kinked demand curve due to the anticipated reactions of competitors to price changes
  • The kink occurs at the prevailing market price, with demand being relatively inelastic above the kink and relatively elastic below the kink
  • Firms have little incentive to change prices due to the potential for price wars or loss of market share, leading to price rigidity
• Dominant firm model describes a market where one large firm has a significant cost advantage and sets prices, while smaller firms act as a competitive fringe
  • The dominant firm maximizes its profits, taking into account the supply response of the competitive fringe
  • The competitive fringe firms are price takers and produce at the point where price equals their marginal cost

Real-World Applications

• Airline industry exhibits oligopolistic characteristics, with a small number of large carriers dominating the market (Delta, American Airlines, United Airlines)
  • Airlines engage in price discrimination, offering different fares based on factors such as booking time, route popularity, and customer loyalty
  • Frequent flyer programs and hub-and-spoke networks create switching costs and barriers to entry, reinforcing the oligopolistic structure
• Wireless telecommunications industry is an oligopoly, with a few large providers (Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile) controlling a significant market share
  • Wireless carriers compete on factors such as network coverage, data speeds, and pricing plans to differentiate their services
  • Mergers and acquisitions have increased concentration in the industry, raising concerns about market power and potential collusion
• Automobile industry is characterized by a small number of large, multinational firms (Toyota, Volkswagen, General Motors) with significant economies of scale
  • Automakers engage in non-price competition through product differentiation, advertising, and innovation in areas such as fuel efficiency and autonomous driving technology
  • Strategic partnerships and joint ventures are common in the industry, allowing firms to share costs and access new markets
• Pharmaceutical industry is an oligopoly, with a few large firms (Pfizer, Merck, Johnson & Johnson) dominating the market for prescription drugs
  • Patents create temporary monopolies and high barriers to entry, allowing firms to charge high prices and earn significant profits
  • Generic drug manufacturers act as a competitive fringe, entering the market when patents expire and driving down prices

Limitations and Critiques

• Oligopoly models often rely on simplifying assumptions, such as homogeneous products, identical costs, and perfect information, which may not hold in real-world markets
• The static nature of some oligopoly models, such as the Cournot and Bertrand models, may not capture the dynamic and evolving nature of competition in real markets
• Game theory assumes that firms are rational and have complete information about their competitors' strategies and payoffs, which may not always be the case
• Collusive agreements, even if they are tacit and not formally enforced, can be difficult to maintain in practice due to the incentive for firms to cheat and the risk of detection by antitrust authorities
• The focus on price and quantity competition in oligopoly models may overlook the importance of non-price factors, such as product quality, innovation, and customer loyalty, in shaping market outcomes
• Oligopoly models often do not account for the role of government intervention, such as antitrust regulations, subsidies, or price controls, which can significantly impact market dynamics
• The welfare implications of oligopolies are complex and depend on factors such as the degree of market power, the intensity of competition, and the efficiency of firms
  • While oligopolies can lead to higher prices and reduced output compared to perfect competition, they may also generate efficiencies through economies of scale and incentives for innovation
• Empirical studies of oligopolies often face challenges in measuring key variables, such as marginal costs and demand elasticities, and in disentangling the effects of firm behavior from other market factors