12.2 Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism in Ethics
7 min read•july 30, 2024
and are two key approaches to understanding moral statements in ethics. Cognitivists argue that express beliefs that can be true or false, while non-cognitivists see them as expressions of emotions or attitudes rather than factual claims.
These views have major implications for how we understand moral knowledge, disagreement, and reasoning. Cognitivism aligns with common intuitions about moral truth but faces challenges explaining moral facts, while non-cognitivism avoids some metaphysical issues but struggles to account for moral debate and progress.
Cognitivism vs Non-cognitivism
Truth-Aptness and Belief-Expression
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- Cognitivist theories hold that moral statements are truth-apt, expressing beliefs that can be true or false (e.g. "Lying is morally wrong" is either true or false)
- Non-cognitivist theories deny moral statements are truth-apt, instead viewing them as expressions of emotions, attitudes, or prescriptions rather than descriptive claims (e.g. "Lying is morally wrong" expresses disapproval of lying, not a truth-apt belief)
Descriptivism vs Expressivism
- Cognitivist theories treat moral statements as descriptive claims about objective moral facts or truths that exist independently of what anyone thinks about them
- Non-cognitivist theories treat moral statements as expressions of subjective mental states like emotions or attitudes, or as prescriptions or imperatives, rather than as descriptions of objective facts
- Examples of cognitivist theories include (moral facts are natural facts) and (moral facts are sui generis non-natural facts)
- Examples of non-cognitivist theories include (moral statements express emotions), (moral statements are imperatives), and (moral statements express acceptance of norms)
Relationship to Moral Realism and Anti-Realism
- Cognitivism is closely associated with , the view that there are objective moral facts that exist independently of what anyone thinks
- If moral statements are truth-apt descriptions of objective moral reality, as cognitivism holds, this presupposes that such an objective moral reality exists, as moral realism asserts
- Non-cognitivism is closely associated with , the denial of objective moral facts
- If moral statements merely express subjective attitudes or norms rather than describing objective facts, as non-cognitivism holds, this suggests a rejection of moral realism
- However, some cognitivists are anti-realists (e.g. subjectivists who think moral statements describe mind-dependent truths) and some non-cognitivists are quasi-realists (e.g. expressivists who think we can earn the right to realist-sounding moral talk)
Strengths and Weaknesses of Ethical Theories
Intuitive Appeal and Common Sense
- A key strength of cognitivism is its alignment with the common intuition that moral statements can be straightforwardly true or false, an intuition reflected in ordinary moral discourse ("It's true that lying is wrong")
- Non-cognitivism has difficulty accommodating the intuitive sense that we can make genuine moral assertions, have moral beliefs, and engage in substantive moral disagreements
- Conversely, non-cognitivism aligns with the intuition that morality is fundamentally about attitudes, emotions and prescriptions rather than facts - it captures the practical, action-guiding dimension of morality
- Cognitivism's treatment of moral statements as descriptive claims can seem to miss the inherently motivational, emotional and prescriptive aspects of moral thought and talk
Moral Knowledge and Moral Progress
- Cognitivism can straightforwardly account for moral knowledge and moral progress in terms of increasing understanding of objective moral truths
- If some moral statements are true, as cognitivism allows, then we can have moral knowledge (justified true moral beliefs) and make moral progress by discovering new moral truths through reason and experience
- Non-cognitivism has a harder time explaining what moral knowledge and moral progress could consist in if moral statements are not truth-apt
- Some non-cognitivists (quasi-realists) try to earn the right to talk of moral knowledge and progress in an expressivist framework, but this is a challenging project
Moral Disagreement and Moral Debate
- Non-cognitivism has an easier time explaining fundamental , since disagreement in attitudes or prescriptions is less puzzling than disagreement about objective facts
- If moral judgments express attitudes rather than beliefs, we can easily understand how people's attitudes might differ, even in the face of the same facts
- Cognitivism seems to imply that in any moral disagreement, at least one party must be mistaken, which can be hard to swallow in cases of apparently intractable moral disagreement between epistemic peers
- However, cognitivism can argue that persistent disagreement is explained by the difficulty of the subject matter, distorting influences, or uneven distribution of moral insight; moral truths may be hard to know
- Cognitivism also has an easier time accounting for the point and substance of moral debate and reasoning, since it views such activities as aimed at discovering the moral truth
- Non-cognitivism must work harder to explain the nature and purpose of moral reasoning and debate if not aimed at moral truth, though sophisticated non-cognitivists have developed accounts (e.g. Gibbardian norm-)
Cognitivism/Non-cognitivism and Moral Realism
Metaphysical and Epistemological Challenges for Realism
- Moral realism, in positing objective moral facts, faces significant metaphysical and epistemological challenges that non-cognitivist anti-realism avoids
- Metaphysically, realism must account for the existence and nature of objective moral facts - what are they and how do they fit into our scientific understanding of the world?
- Epistemologically, realism must explain how we can come to know objective moral facts - what faculty allows us to access this realm of truths?
- Non-cognitivist anti-realism escapes these challenges by denying that there are any objective moral facts to begin with - there is no mysterious moral reality to account for metaphysically or epistemically
- However, cognitivist anti-realism (subjectivism, relativism) also avoids these challenges while still maintaining that moral statements are truth-apt beliefs
Fitting Attitudes and Moral Motivation
- Cognitivist realism has an easier time accounting for the action-guiding, motivational force of moral judgments
- If sincerely judging an action to be right consists in believing it to have the objective property of rightness, we can readily understand why this would tend to motivate the action
- For non-cognitivists, the connection between moral judgment and motivation is less clear - why should a mere attitude or prescription motivate in the absence of a supporting moral belief?
- Some non-cognitivists argue moral attitudes are inherently motivational in a way mere descriptive beliefs are not (e.g. Stevenson's "magnetism" of good), but this is controversial
- Cognitivist anti-realists can argue that believing an action to be right relative to one's own subjective standards or the norms one accepts can also motivate accordingly
Quasi-Realist Challenges to the Cognitivism/Realism Link
- Sophisticated non-cognitivists have challenged the tight link between cognitivism and realism, arguing that an expressivist view can still accommodate realist-sounding moral talk
- Quasi-realists like Blackburn and Gibbard argue that from within an expressivist framework, we can "earn the right" to speak of objective moral facts and truths
- The basic idea is that the linguistic practices expressivism best explains naturally evolve to take on a realist character for good practical purposes
- So expressivists can say there are moral truths, moral knowledge, and moral progress - it's just that these are not to be understood as cognitivist moral realism understands them
- This is an ambitious project and faces significant challenges, but if successful would undermine a key advantage of cognitivism over non-cognitivism
Implications for Moral Discourse and Disagreement
The Nature of Moral Disagreement
- Cognitivism implies that moral disagreements are ultimately disagreements in belief about objective facts - at least one party must be mistaken
- This can make the prevalence and persistence of moral disagreement seem puzzling - if there are objective moral facts, why is there so much disagreement about them?
- Non-cognitivism implies that moral disagreements are at bottom clashes of attitude, emotion, or commitment - more like differences in taste than differences in factual belief
- This makes moral disagreement seem less mysterious - people's attitudes and sentiments can naturally differ even given the same facts
- However, it also arguably makes moral disagreement seem less deep and rationally tractable - there may be no fact of the matter about who is right in a clash of attitudes
The Function of Moral Discourse and Reasoning
- Cognitivism suggests that the function of moral discourse and reasoning is to discover and transmit moral truths by sharing evidence and arguments
- We can engage in rational moral persuasion aimed at changing beliefs by showing that certain moral claims are true or false, justified or unjustified
- Non-cognitivism makes the function of moral discourse and reasoning less clear - what are we doing when we argue about morality if not seeking the moral truth?
- Non-cognitivists have argued that we can still make sense of moral reasoning as a practical activity aimed at resolving disagreements in attitude and coordinating our feelings and behavior
- But there is a worry that non-cognitivism, in denying truth-apt moral beliefs, undermines the substance and point of moral debate and inquiry
Accommodating Moral Phenomenology
- Both cognitivism and non-cognitivism face challenges in accommodating the lived experience of moral thought and discourse
- Cognitivism captures the objective purport of moral statements - the feeling that we are stating facts about mind-independent moral reality when we make moral claims
- But it struggles to capture the intrinsically motivational, emotional, and prescriptive character of moral judgments - the fact that sincerely judging an action wrong typically involves disapproving of and being motivated to avoid it
- Non-cognitivism captures the practical and expressive dimensions of moral thought, but has a harder time accounting for the objective, descriptive, and truth-oriented features of moral phenomenology
- After all, we do think and speak as if we are representing objective moral facts, not just expressing attitudes - realist-sounding language pervades everyday moral discourse
- Quasi-realist versions of non-cognitivism try to resolve this tension by showing how an expressivist view can still "earn the right" to realist-sounding moral talk, but whether they fully succeed is controversial
Key Terms to Review (24)
Cognitive Thesis: The cognitive thesis is the position in ethics that asserts moral statements express beliefs that can be true or false, meaning they convey knowledge about moral facts. This view aligns with cognitivism, which holds that ethical propositions are capable of being assessed for their truth value, contrasting with non-cognitivist theories that view moral statements as expressions of emotions or prescriptions.
Cognitivism: Cognitivism is the philosophical view that moral statements express beliefs that can be true or false, suggesting that ethical claims are objective and can be evaluated for their truthfulness. This perspective asserts that when we make moral judgments, we are stating facts about the world, which implies that there is a reality to moral truths that exists independently of our perceptions or feelings. Cognitivism contrasts with non-cognitivism, which holds that moral statements do not express true propositions but rather convey emotional responses or prescriptions.
David Hume: David Hume was an 18th-century Scottish philosopher known for his influential ideas in empiricism and skepticism, particularly regarding the nature of human understanding and morality. His work laid the groundwork for modern philosophy, emphasizing that knowledge derives from sensory experiences and highlighting the distinction between descriptive statements about the world and prescriptive moral claims.
Descriptive Statements: Descriptive statements are assertions that aim to describe the world as it is, conveying factual information without expressing personal beliefs or opinions. In the context of ethics, these statements can serve as a foundation for understanding moral claims by distinguishing between what is the case and what ought to be the case.
Emotivism: Emotivism is a non-cognitive ethical theory suggesting that moral judgments express emotional responses rather than objective truths. It emphasizes that when people make moral statements, they are primarily expressing their feelings or attitudes towards a particular action rather than stating facts about the world. This view connects deeply with discussions about the nature of moral claims and the role of emotions in ethical reasoning.
Epistemic Access: Epistemic access refers to the ability to gain knowledge or justification about beliefs, especially in the context of understanding moral truths. This concept is crucial in distinguishing between cognitivism and non-cognitivism in ethics, as it raises questions about whether moral statements can be known or justified in the same way that factual statements can. It also relates to how individuals can access moral truths and the implications this has for ethical theories.
Ethical Statements: Ethical statements are assertions that express judgments about what is morally right or wrong, good or bad. These statements often serve as the basis for ethical reasoning and can be categorized into different frameworks, influencing how individuals and societies perceive moral issues. Understanding ethical statements is crucial for exploring debates surrounding cognitivism and non-cognitivism in ethics, as these frameworks differ in how they interpret the nature and truth-value of such statements.
Expressivism: Expressivism is a non-cognitivist theory in ethics that suggests moral statements do not aim to describe the world or assert truths, but instead express emotional responses or attitudes. This perspective emphasizes that when individuals make moral claims, they are essentially sharing their feelings or encouraging others to adopt similar attitudes, rather than stating facts about moral properties. This view connects closely with debates surrounding the nature of moral language and the distinction between different forms of ethical theory.
Gilbert Gibbard: Gilbert Gibbard is a prominent philosopher known for his contributions to metaethics, particularly in the context of non-cognitivism and expressivism. He argues that moral statements do not describe states of affairs but instead express emotional attitudes or prescriptions about actions. His work is pivotal in understanding the implications of non-cognitivism, as it challenges the traditional views of moral truth and knowledge.
Intuitionism: Intuitionism is a moral theory suggesting that humans have an innate ability to discern right from wrong through direct intuition rather than through reasoning or empirical evidence. This theory emphasizes the role of moral intuitions as fundamental to ethical judgments, arguing that certain moral truths are self-evident and accessible to human understanding without the need for further justification.
Moral anti-realism: Moral anti-realism is the philosophical position that denies the existence of objective moral truths or facts independent of human beliefs and attitudes. This view suggests that moral statements do not reflect objective reality, but instead express individual or cultural preferences, emotions, or social conventions. Moral anti-realism contrasts with the idea that there are universal and objective moral truths that apply to all individuals regardless of their beliefs.
Moral Claims: Moral claims are statements that express judgments about what is right or wrong, good or bad, and are often presented as universal truths. They are foundational to ethical theories and debates, serving as a way to convey moral beliefs and principles. Understanding moral claims involves recognizing their role in both cognitivism, which views them as factual assertions that can be true or false, and non-cognitivism, which sees them as expressions of emotional attitudes or prescriptions rather than objective truths.
Moral disagreement: Moral disagreement refers to the situation where individuals or groups hold conflicting views about what is morally right or wrong. This concept is significant as it highlights the complexities of moral judgments, which can be influenced by various factors such as culture, personal beliefs, and emotional responses. Understanding moral disagreement helps in navigating debates about ethical issues, recognizing that diverse perspectives can coexist and often stem from deeper philosophical foundations.
Moral Naturalism: Moral naturalism is the philosophical view that moral facts and values are rooted in natural properties and can be understood through empirical observation and scientific inquiry. This perspective posits that ethical statements can be true or false based on the same types of evidence that apply to natural sciences, linking moral truths to human nature, social conditions, and biological factors. As a result, moral naturalism aligns closely with cognitivism, which asserts that moral statements express beliefs that can be true or false, and it also supports the idea of universal moral truths grounded in objective reality.
Moral non-naturalism: Moral non-naturalism is the ethical theory that asserts moral properties and facts are not reducible to natural properties, such as those found in science or human psychology. This viewpoint holds that moral truths exist independently of our understanding or perception and are not contingent upon naturalistic explanations, making moral claims objective and universal.
Moral objectivity: Moral objectivity is the idea that certain moral truths exist independently of individual opinions or beliefs. This means that some actions can be deemed right or wrong regardless of personal feelings or cultural perspectives, leading to a universal standard for evaluating moral claims. The concept challenges subjective interpretations of morality, asserting that ethical statements can be true or false based on objective criteria.
Moral Realism: Moral realism is the philosophical view that there are objective moral truths that exist independently of individual beliefs or perceptions. This perspective asserts that moral statements can be true or false based on factual conditions, much like statements in science, and it contrasts with views that deny the objectivity of morality, such as subjectivism and anti-realism. Moral realism supports the idea that ethical claims reflect real features of the world, making it essential for understanding debates about the nature of morality.
Moral Subjectivism: Moral subjectivism is the ethical view that moral judgments are based on personal feelings, beliefs, and opinions rather than objective truths. This perspective suggests that what is considered right or wrong can vary from person to person, emphasizing individual perspectives and the subjective nature of morality. As a non-cognitivist approach, moral subjectivism posits that moral statements do not express propositions that can be true or false, but rather reflect personal attitudes or emotions.
Non-Cognitive Thesis: The non-cognitive thesis is the view in ethics that moral statements do not express beliefs that can be true or false, but rather express emotional attitudes or prescriptions. This idea emphasizes that when people make moral claims, they are not merely stating facts about the world, but instead are conveying their feelings, preferences, or motivations toward certain actions or behaviors. Thus, non-cognitivism challenges traditional views of ethics by suggesting that moral discourse is fundamentally different from factual discourse.
Non-Cognitivism: Non-cognitivism is a meta-ethical theory suggesting that moral statements do not express beliefs or truths but rather emotional attitudes or prescriptions. This view emphasizes that moral judgments are expressions of our feelings or motivations rather than factual claims about the world, challenging the idea that moral statements can be true or false like scientific ones.
Norm-expressivism: Norm-expressivism is a non-cognitivist ethical theory that suggests moral statements do not convey beliefs or facts but instead express emotional attitudes or prescriptions about how to act. This approach emphasizes the role of normative language in expressing commitments or stances, rather than merely stating what is true or false. Essentially, norm-expressivism highlights that when people make moral claims, they are often revealing their feelings or urging others to adopt certain behaviors, rather than asserting objective truths.
Prescriptive Statements: Prescriptive statements are expressions that convey how things ought to be, often prescribing actions, behaviors, or moral judgments. These statements are central to ethical discussions, as they reflect normative views about what is right or wrong, good or bad, and imply an obligation or recommendation for action. In the context of ethics, understanding prescriptive statements is vital because they contrast with descriptive statements that merely describe the world without imposing any values.
Prescriptivism: Prescriptivism is an ethical theory suggesting that moral statements are not merely descriptive but are instead expressions of commands or prescriptions that guide actions. This view implies that when we make moral claims, we are urging others to act in a certain way, rather than simply stating facts about the world. By emphasizing the prescriptive nature of moral language, this theory intersects with debates on the nature of moral knowledge and whether moral truths can be objective or universal.
Simon Blackburn: Simon Blackburn is a contemporary British philosopher known for his work in the fields of ethics, philosophy of language, and metaphysics. His contributions are particularly significant in the discussion of moral philosophy, where he defends a version of non-cognitivism and explores the implications of moral language and thought. Blackburn's ideas challenge traditional views on moral statements, proposing that they do not merely express factual claims but are instead intertwined with emotional and prescriptive dimensions.